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1A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule:
Generalizing May￿ s Theorem in a Restricted
Informational Environment1
Abstract: May￿ s theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple
majority rule uniquely satis￿es four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited
as a general argument for majority rule, it has never been extended beyond pairwise decisions.
Here we generalize May￿ s theorem to decisions between many options where voters each cast
one vote. We show that, surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satis￿es May￿ s conditions. Our
result suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society￿ s balloting procedure collects
only a single vote from each voter, then plurality rule is the uniquely compelling procedure
for electoral decisions.
Social choice theorists in Condorcet￿ s and Borda￿ s tradition are idealistic electoral
reformers in at least two respects. First, they propose certain ideals with respect to
the information we should collect from voters in a balloting procedure. Second, they
propose certain ideals with respect to how we should aggregate that information in
an aggregation procedure, so as to make a decision on its basis. A fully ￿ edged voting
procedure consists of both a balloting procedure and an aggregation procedure.2
In this article, we want to be only half as idealistic. Here we take balloting proce-
dures as they are, and consider aggregation procedures as they might be. We o⁄er a
conditional defense of ￿plurality rule.￿If a society￿ s balloting procedure collects only
a single vote from each voter, then plurality rule, which always chooses the option
1We are grateful to Dennis Mueller, Franz Dietrich and two anonymous referees for helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this paper.
2The same balloting procedure may go along with di⁄erent aggregation procedures (e.g., full-
preference balloting with pairwise majority voting, STV, AV, the Borda count etc.) and the same
aggregation procedure with di⁄erent balloting procedures (e.g., plurality rule with secret single-vote
balloting, open single-vote balloting, and even full-preference balloting).
2with the most votes, is the uniquely compelling aggregation procedure; we show that
it is so, in the sense that it uniquely satis￿es May￿ s well-known minimal conditions
on a democratic procedure generalized to decisions over any number of options.3 Our
result thus constitutes a many-option generalization of May￿ s classical theorem on
majority rule in the distinctive, but politically common, informational environment
of single-vote balloting. May￿ s conditions are widely regarded as normatively com-
pelling in the two-option case, for which they were originally formulated, and we
suggest that they remain compelling in the many-option case considered here.4
Our result should be of interest in at least two respects. First, to the best of
our knowledge, plurality rule has never been associated with May￿ s theorem or a
many-option version of May￿ s conditions. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
plurality rule has traditionally been held in low esteem, among both formal social
choice theorists and philosophical theorists of democracy. Thus any positive argument
for plurality rule appears to go against the grain.
So what about plurality rule￿ s well-known defects? For example, plurality rule
violates several desiderata that social choice theorists often expect aggregation pro-
cedures for many-option decisions to meet, including Condorcet consistency (￿the
Condorcet winner should be selected if it exists￿ ) and consistency of the winning
option under a contraction or expansion of the set of available options. But for-
mulating these desiderata requires referring to voters￿full preference orderings, and
implementing them in an aggregation procedure requires a balloting procedure that
3Speci￿cally, we generalize May￿ s conditions from the case where voters each submit one vote over
two options to the case where they each submit one vote over any number of options.
4To be precise, we focus on regular electoral decisions, where there is no normatively admissi-
ble asymmetry between voters or options, and claim that May￿ s conditions are defensible in such
decisions. In decisions with a normatively admissible asymmetry between voters (e.g. some expert
panels) or options (e.g. some jury decisions or referenda with a status-quo bias), some of May￿ s
conditions may need to be relaxed.
3collects (enough of) this information. Given only a single vote from each voter, we
simply have insu¢ cient information to implement them. For example, we can only
guess as to how expanding or shrinking the set of available options a⁄ects voters￿
single votes, their revealed ￿￿rst choices￿ . Likewise, voters may have incentives to
vote strategically under plurality rule. But without further information about vot-
ers￿preferences, we have no choice but to take voters￿revealed ￿rst choices at face
value.5 To emphasize, we do not unconditionally defend plurality rule. In particular,
we do not defend single-vote balloting procedures; we only make a conditional claim:
If single-vote balloting procedures are used ￿as they often are, in practice ￿then
plurality rule is the way to go.
Of course, collecting only a single vote from each voter is not ideal. For example,
￿the number of voters who think each candidate the worst ... is no less important
... than the number of voters who think each candidate the best￿(Dummett, 1997,
51-52). A balloting procedure that collects voters￿revealed ￿￿rst choices￿alone takes
no account of that. It would undeniably be ideal in many cases to collect voters￿
full preferences, top to bottom, over all the available options. It would at least
be an improvement to collect more (even short of ￿full￿ ) information about these
preferences, through a two-ballot runo⁄ procedure, such as in France, for example.
Such richer informational environments would allow us to use more sophisticated
aggregation procedures than plurality rule.
Realistically, however, that is simply not the way ballots are conducted in many
5Vulnerability to strategic voting is not unique to plurality rule, but shared by all reasonable
aggregation procedures over more than two options, which are typically not strategy-proof (by the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem). But under plurality rule, strategic voting is limited as follows:
voters have an incentive to vote for their preferred option among those two options that they think
are most likely to win. In particular, plurality rule has the property of being ￿immune to insincere
manipulation￿(van Hees and Dowding, 2005).
4places in the world. Many real-world balloting procedures collect only information
about voters￿(revealed) ￿￿rst choices￿ . Instead of ranking alternatives best-to-worst,
people are only asked to vote for a single option. The US, UK and Canada are
the most famous examples of countries employing such balloting procedures in their
legislative elections. But such procedures are also used in many other (sometimes
surprising) countries and international organizations.6
Moreover, as a practical political fact, it is often far easier to change the rules
of how votes are aggregated, in aggregation procedures, than it is to change how
votes are collected, in balloting procedures. The latter involves changing the formal
rules governing the behavior of millions of voters.7 The former involves changing the
formal rules governing the behavior of perhaps only a few hundred election o¢ cials.
Suppose then that, as a practical real-world constraint, the single-vote balloting
procedure is given. The other half of the social choice theorists￿ideal nonetheless re-
mains in play. We still need to ask what the best way is to aggregate the information
collected by this balloting procedure into a social decision. This question has not
been addressed in the social-choice-theoretic literature. We seek to give an answer.
After introducing May￿ s theorem in Section 1, we prove our new theorem in Section
2, which generalizes May￿ s result to decisions over more than two options in the given
restricted informational environment. In Section 3, we discuss the informational basis
6Other countries include Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Ivory Coast, Cuba, North Korea, India, Gambia, Grenada, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Latvia, Malawi, Maldives, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa
(Western), Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa (for directly elected
seats), Thailand (mixed system), Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uganda, Tanzania (the di-
rectly elected members), Zambia, Zimbabwe.
7Of course, a change in the aggregation procedure may also induce a change in electoral behavior;
but at least the formal rules on the collection of votes remain the same.
5of voting. Finally, to illustrate the conditional nature of our argument for plurality
rule, we show in Section 4 that, if we use the richer informational environment of ap-
proval balloting instead of single-vote balloting, our May-style argument for plurality
rule becomes a novel May-style argument for approval voting (Brams and Fishburn,
1978). Our ￿ndings highlight that the question about the most compelling aggrega-
tion procedure depends on the informational environment in which this procedure is
meant to operate. In Section 5, we make some concluding remarks.
1 May￿ s theorem
May￿ s (1952) classical theorem states that, in social decisions between two options,
simple majority rule, uniquely among all aggregation procedures, satis￿es the four
normatively appealing conditions of being: open to all inputs (￿universal domain￿ );
not biased in favor of any particular voter (￿anonymity￿ ); not biased in favor of any
particular outcome (￿neutrality￿ ); and ￿positively responsive￿to people￿ s votes (if
one or more voters change their votes in favor of one option and no others change
theirs, then the social decision does not change in the opposite direction; and if the
outcome was a tie before the change, then the tie is broken in the direction of the
change). In both formal social choice theory and democratic theory more generally,
this result occupies a prominent place as an argument for democratic rule, in the form
of simple majority rule.
In the formal social choice literature, May￿ s theorem ￿is deservedly considered
a minor classic￿ (Barry and Hardin, 1982, 298). It is one of the ￿rst things said
on the subject of ￿normative properties of social decision rules￿ , in all the classic
overviews, beginning with Luce and Rai⁄a￿ s Games and Decisions (1957, 357-358)
and running through Mueller￿ s Public Choice III (2003, 133-136). Arrow comments
on it in the notes appended to the second edition of Social Choice and Individual
6Values (1951/1963, 100-102). Sen discusses it in Collective Choice and Social Welfare
(1970, 68, 70-1) and extends it in a paper with Pattanaik (Sen and Pattanaik, 1969).
Several other social choice theorists o⁄er derivations and extensions (e.g., Murakami,
1966, 1968; Pattanaik, 1971, 50-52; Fishburn, 1973, 50, 57 ⁄.; Shepsle and Bonchek,
1997, 160-162; Cantillon and Rangel, 2002).
Because its proof is relatively straightforward, May￿ s theorem may count only as
a ￿minor￿classic in the formal social choice literature, but it has been received as a
major ￿nding within democratic theory more generally. In a ￿eld replete with negative
￿ndings (impossibility, instability and manipulability results),8 May￿ s theorem stands
out as a powerful positive result supporting democratic rule.
Consider these examples, to get a sense of how deeply May￿ s theorem has pen-
etrated non-formal democratic theory. In Democracy and Its Critics, the capstone
of Robert Dahl￿ s lifelong work on democratic theory, May￿ s theorem is invoked as
the second of his ￿four justi￿cations for majority rule￿(Dahl, 1989, 139-141). May￿ s
theorem is one of the ￿rst considerations that William Riker (1982, 59 ⁄.) feels the
need to neutralize, in his argument against populist democracy in Liberalism Against
Populism. May￿ s theorem is also one of the ￿rst considerations o⁄ered in defense of
liberal democracy in Ackerman￿ s Social Justice and the Liberal State (1980, 277-285).
It is a key element in ￿political equality￿as conceptualized by both Beitz (1989, 59)
and Christiano (1990, 154-157; 1993, 183; 1996), and continual reference is made to it
across democratic theory (Coleman and Ferejohn, 1986, 18-19; Martin, 1993, 367-368
n. 5; Saward, 1998, 69; Waldron, 1999, 148, 189 n. 38; Risse, 2004, 51-5).
However, May￿ s theorem, as proven by May and used in the subsequent literature,
8The most prominent negative results are Arrow￿ s theorem (1951/1963) and results about cyclical
social preferences and electoral disequilibrium (Sen, 1970, 1977; Scho￿eld, 1976; McKelvey, 1979; cf.
Mackie, 2003) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on strategic manipulability (Gibbard, 1973;
Satterthwaite, 1975). For an overview, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1999).
7applies only to decisions between two options or a sequence of two-option decisions.
But in the real world our choices are rarely between only two options (or if they are,
that is often the result of an undemocratic agenda setting process; e.g. Riker, 1982,
59-60). Curiously, in the formal social choice literature, May￿ s theorem has never
been extended beyond pairwise decisions.9 In more informal discussions, the problem
is occasionally noted but never pursued. Thus, for example, Coleman and Ferejohn
(1996, 18) remark upon the need to extend May￿ s theorem to ￿admissible choice
on larger sets of alternatives [than just two] by voting rules that are extensions of
binary majority rule￿ ; but they ￿leave aside￿the question of ￿what would constitute
an extension of simple majority rule￿ in the case of more-than-two options. Risse
(2004, 51-52 n. 25) observes that ￿May￿ s Theorem only applies when groups decide
on two options￿ , adding in a note that, ￿There surely could be some mathematical
generalization of May￿ s Theorem, but no such generalization is likely to preserve the
elementary character of the assumptions of May￿ s Theorem￿ .
The proof below puts paid to that speculation. We show that May￿ s theorem can
be extended to the many-option case, where voters each cast a single vote for one
option. Our conditions are straightforward generalizations of May￿ s original ones. We
prove that ￿perhaps surprisingly, given its bad reputation ￿plurality rule uniquely
satis￿es those conditions.
While there are other axiomatic characterizations of plurality rule in the literature
9Pattanaik (1971, pp 50-51) generalizes May￿ s conditions to the many-option case, but applies
those conditions to other problems rather than May￿ s theorem itself. Also, much work has been
done formally extending May￿ s theorem ￿just not in the present way, to imply plurality rule over
more than two options. For example, pairwise majority voting can be characterized by imposing
May￿ s original conditions on each pairwise ranking (under independence of irrelevant alternatives),
e.g. Cantillon and Rangel (2002). Such an extension preserves the original pairwise format of May￿ s
theorem, but also involves a richer informational environment than we are often in politically, namely
full-preference balloting.
8(e.g., Roberts, 1991; Ching, 1996), we are not aware of any contribution ￿formal or
informal ￿that associates May￿ s theorem, or a many-option version of May￿ s precise
conditions, with plurality rule.
2 Generalizing May￿ s theorem to more than two options
2.1 An informal statement
There are n individuals and k options. May￿ s original theorem addresses the special
case k = 2. Our result holds for any positive k ￿ 2. Each individual submits a
vote for one option or abstains. A combination of votes across individuals is called
a pro￿le. This captures the informational environment of single-vote balloting. An
aggregation procedure is a function that assigns to each such pro￿le a corresponding
outcome. The outcome is either a single winning option or a tie between two or more
options. May￿ s conditions can be generalized to the k-option case as follows:
Universal domain. The aggregation procedure accepts all logically possible
pro￿les of votes as admissible input.
Anonymity. The outcome of the aggregation procedure is invariant under a
permutation of the votes across individuals.
Neutrality. If the votes are permuted across options, then the outcome is per-
muted accordingly.
Positive responsiveness. If one or more voters change their votes in favor of
an option that is winning or tied and no other voters change theirs, then that option
is uniquely winning after the change.
We de￿ne plurality rule as follows. For any pro￿le, the option, if unique, that
receives the largest number of votes, is chosen as the winner; if there is no unique
9such option, then all the options that receive an equal largest number of votes are
tied.
Theorem. An aggregation procedure satis￿es universal domain, anonymity, neu-
trality and positive responsiveness if and only if it is plurality rule.
2.2 A formal statement
There are n individuals, labeled 1;:::;n, and k options, labeled 1;:::;k. Each indi-
vidual votes for precisely one option or abstains. Individual i￿ s vote is denoted vi and
represented by one of the following column vectors:










































































A pro￿le (of votes) is a matrix v = (v1;:::;vn), i.e. a row vector of column
vectors. We write vij to denote the entry in column i and row j in v. So vij = 1
means that individual i votes for option j. (In particular, if vij = 1 then vih = 0 for
all h 6= j.)
An aggregation procedure is a function f that maps each pro￿le v to an outcome



















, where each xj is either 0 or 1 and at least one xj is 1. For
each j, we write f(v)j = xj. Informally, f(v)j = 1 means that option j is winning or
tied, and f(v)j = 0 means that option j is non-winning. By de￿nition, for any pro￿le,
there is at least one option j with f(v)j = 1. If there is exactly one such option, this
10option is the unique winner; if there is more than one such option, all the options j
with f(v)j = 1 are tied.
Now May￿ s conditions generalized to k-option choices can be formally stated as
follows:
Universal Domain. The domain of f is the set of all logically possible pro￿les.
Anonymity. Let ￿ be any permutation of the n individuals, represented by a
permutation of columns. For any pro￿le v, f(v) = f(￿(v)).
Neutrality. Let ￿ be any permutation of the k options, represented by a permu-
tation of rows. For any pro￿le v, f(￿(v)) = ￿(f(v)).
For any two pro￿les v and w and any option j, we write v ￿j w if and only if
there exists some option h such that
for some individuals i, vij > wij and vih < wih,10
and for all other individuals i, vi = wi.
Informally, if a pro￿le changes from w to v, then v ￿j w means that at least one
individual￿ s vote changes towards option j from some other option h, while all other
votes remain the same.
Positive responsiveness. For any two pro￿les v and w and any j, if f(w)j = 1
and v ￿j w, then f(w)j = 1 and, for all h 6= j, f(w)h = 0.
If k = 2, these conditions reduce to the standard conditions of May￿ s theorem.
10And vil = wil for all options l 6= j;h. Under single-vote balloting, this clause is already implied
by vij > wij and vih < wih. However, in the alternative environment of approval balloting discussed
below, we need to add this clause explicitly.












vih for all h 6= j;
0 otherwise.
We can now state our result.
Theorem. An aggregation procedure satis￿es universal domain, anonymity, neu-
trality and positive responsiveness if and only if it is plurality rule.
2.3 The proof
It is easy to see that plurality rule satis￿es all the conditions. Universal domain is
satis￿ed because plurality rule is de￿ned for all logically possible pro￿les. Anonymity
is satis￿ed because the plurality winner (or tied set of options) depends only on the
number of votes for each option, not on the voters￿identities. Neutrality is satis￿ed
because the question of whether an option is winning, tied or losing depends only
on the number of votes for this option and its contenders, not on these options￿
labels. Finally, positive responsiveness is satis￿ed because, under plurality rule, any
additional votes for a winning option do not hurt that option, and any additional
votes for a tied option break the tie in favor of that option.
Suppose, conversely, that an aggregation procedure f satis￿es all the conditions.
For any pro￿le v, we call the column vector a =
n P
i=1
vi a votes vector. Every such



















where each aj ￿ 0 and a1 +:::+ak ￿ n. Here
a1 is the number of votes for option 1, a2 the number of votes for option 2, and so
on.
12Claim 1. The aggregation procedure f can be represented by a function g whose
domain is the set of all possible votes vectors and whose co-domain is the same as




Proof of claim 1. Claim 1 follows from the anonymity of f, which implies that,






wi then f(v) = f(w).
Claim 2. For any votes vector a and any permutation of rows ￿, g(￿(a)) =
￿(g(a)).
Proof of claim 2. Given claim 1, claim 2 follows from the neutrality of f.
For any two votes vectors a and b and any option j, we write a ￿j b if and only
if there exists some option h such that
aj = bj + e and ah = bh ￿ e where e > 0,
and for all options l 6= j;h, al = bl.
Informally, if a votes vector changes from b to a, then a ￿j b means that option
j gains e votes at the expense of some other option h, while all other options receive
an equal number of votes.
Claim 3. For any two votes vectors a and b and any j, if g(b)j = 1 and a ￿j b,
then g(a)j = 1 and, for all h 6= j, g(a)h = 0.
Proof of claim 3. Given claim 1, claim 3 follows from the positive responsiveness
of f.
Claim 4. For each votes vector a, g(a)j = 1 if and only if aj ￿ ah for all h 6= j.
Proof of claim 4. First, consider a votes vector a such that g(a)j = 1. Assume,
for a contradiction, that aj < ah for some h 6= j. Write ah = aj +e (with e > 0). Let
13￿ be the row permutation which swaps rows j and h and leaves all other rows ￿xed.
By claim 2, g(￿(a)) = ￿(g(a)). Hence g(￿(a))h = ￿(g(a))h = g(a)j = 1. Note that
￿(a)j = ah = aj +e and ￿(a)h = aj = ah ￿e; also, for all l 6= j;h, we have ￿(a)l = al.
Therefore ￿(a) ￿j a. By claim 3, g(￿(a))j = 1 and, for all l 6= j, g(￿(a))l = 0. In
particular, this implies g(￿(a))h = 0, a contradiction.
Next, consider a votes vector a such that aj ￿ ah for all h 6= j. Assume, for a
contradiction, that g(a)j = 0. As g has the same co-domain as f, there must exist
some h such that g(a)h = 1 (and h 6= j as g(a)j = 0). Again let ￿ be the row
permutation which swaps rows j and h and leaves all other rows ￿xed. By claim 2,
g(￿(a)) = ￿(g(a)) and hence g(￿(a))h = ￿(g(a))h = g(a)j = 0. Now either aj = ah
or aj > ah. If aj = ah, then ￿(a) = a, in which case g(a)h = g(￿(a))h = 0, a
contradiction. If ah < aj, write aj = ah + e (with e > 0) and note that ￿(a)h = aj =
ah + e and ￿(a)j = ah = aj ￿ e; also, for all l 6= j;h, we have ￿(a)l = al. Therefore
￿(a) ￿h a. By claim 3, g(￿(a))h = 1, a contradiction.
Claims 1 and 4 now imply that f is plurality rule.
3 The informational environment of voting
We have generalized May￿ s classical theorem to many-option decisions in the informa-
tional environment in which voters each submit a single vote for one of the options.
As noted, this informational environment is very di⁄erent from one in which voters
reveal their full preference orderings over all options, top to bottom.
Following Sen￿ s pioneering work (1970, 1982), questions about the appropriate
informational basis of social choice have received considerable attention. But much
of this debate has focused on welfare-economic applications of social choice theory
rather than voting-theoretic ones. For example, a much discussed question is how
14to measure the e⁄ects of alternative policies or social states on individual welfare,
in order to arrive at a social preference ordering over these policies or states. In
particular, it is debated whether only ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable
measures of individual welfare are feasible, as Arrow originally suggested, or whether
we can construct cardinal and/or interpersonally comparable measures of welfare.
By contrast, questions about the appropriate informational basis of voting have
received less attention in the social-choice-theoretic literature. Many formal models
in mainstream voting theory, following Arrow￿ s own model (1951/1963), are based on
an informational environment in which voters￿full preference orderings are available.
There has been little work on the question of what aggregation procedures to use
for electoral decisions in restricted informational environments. By showing that
plurality rule uniquely satis￿es some compelling normative conditions in the restricted
but empirically important informational environment of single-vote balloting, we have
thus contributed towards ￿lling this gap in the literature.
A side e⁄ect of this restricted informational environment is that the notorious
problem of cyclical majority preferences remains hidden here. Given a set of revealed
￿￿rst-choice￿votes, plurality rule always produces a determinate winning option (or
a tied set of options); no cycle can be observed. Nonetheless, in terms of voters￿
underlying full preferences, there may well be majority cycles. Single-vote balloting
does not solve ￿ it merely hides ￿ the problems raised by standard social choice
paradoxes.11
11But, arguably, many prominent responses to these paradoxes, such as Shepsle and Weingast￿ s
(1981) structure-induced equilibrium, also only hide these problems. Although we de￿ne plurality
rule in a restricted informational environment, where a vector of single votes is aggregated into a
winning option or tied set, it can also be de￿ned in a richer environment, where a vector of preference
orderings is aggregated into one of the following outputs: (i) a social preference ordering (Arrow￿ s
framework), (ii) a choice function that assigns to each set of available options a winning option or tied
set (the ￿collective choice rule￿framework), (iii) a single winning option (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
15Notice that many standard critiques of plurality rule do not actually undermine
our conditional claim ￿that plurality rule should be used as an aggregation procedure
if a single-vote balloting procedure is used ￿but they are rather directed against
the antecedent of this conditional, i.e. they criticize the use of single-vote balloting
procedures. (And, as we have noted, we do not defend single-vote balloting here.)
Recall Dummett￿ s above quoted point that ￿the number of voters who think each
candidate the worst ... is no less important ... than the number of voters who think
each candidate the best￿(see further Dummett, 1984, ch. 6; 1997, 51-57). Borda
(1784/1995, 83) begins his critique of plurality rule as follows:
There is a widespread feeling, which I have never heard disputed, that
in a ballot vote, the plurality of votes always shows the will of the voters.
That is, that the candidate who obtains this plurality is necessarily pre-
ferred by the voters to his opponents. But I shall demonstrate that this
feeling, while correct when the election is between just two candidates,
can lead to error in all other cases.
In elaboration, Borda focuses on the balloting procedure underlying plurality rule:
￿If a form of election is to be just, the voters must be able to rank each candidate
according to his merits, compared successively to the merits of each of the others...￿
Plurality rule ￿is highly unsatisfactory￿in those terms, precisely ￿because in this type
framework). Then Arrow￿ s theorem applies in cases (i) and (ii) (suitably reformulated in (ii)), and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem applies in case (iii). Hence plurality rule, suitably de￿ned, violates
some of Arrow￿ s conditions (i.e. IIA and Pareto) and some of Gibbard￿ s and Satterthwaite￿ s (i.e.
strategy-proofness). But Arrow￿ s and Gibbard￿ s and Satterthwaite￿ s theorems cannot be formulated
in the present restricted informational environment, as conditions such as contraction or expansion
consistency, IIA, strategy-proofness etc. are not expressible here. Thus the problems raised by these
theorems remain ￿hidden￿ in that environment, although they occur in a richer environment into
which the restricted one can be embedded.
16of election, the voters cannot give a su¢ ciently complete account of their opinions of
the candidates...￿ .
Fishburn illustrates how single-vote balloting can fail to record important informa-
tion. Consider a 100-person electorate with preferences (best to worst) over options
x, y and z as follows: 34 voters have x ￿ y ￿ z; 33 have y ￿ z ￿ x; 33 have z ￿ y ￿ x.
As Fishburn (1973, 162) observes, ￿Plurality selects x. ... [But] x has 34 ￿rst-place
votes and 66 third-place votes, whereas y has 33 ￿rst-place votes, 57 second-place
votes and no third-place votes. Also, options y and z are each preferred to option x
by a majority of 66 out of 100 voters. Plurality rule decides outcomes on the basis
of ￿rst-preferences alone. If second- and third-preferences are to count for anything
much at all, then surely there should be a strong case for option y being socially
chosen rather than x.￿
In short, standard critiques of plurality rule are in fact critiques of single-vote
balloting; they do not undermine the conditional claim we defend here.
4 From single-vote balloting to approval balloting
To further emphasize the conditional nature of our argument for plurality rule, we
￿nally show that, if we enrich the informational environment and use, for example,
approval balloting instead of single-vote balloting, our May-style argument for plural-
ity rule becomes a May-style argument for approval voting as de￿ned by Brams and
Fishburn (1978). Although we state this result primarily to show that our main theo-
rem depends on the given informational environment, our May-style characterization
of approval voting can also be seen as a novel result in its own right.
In the formal framework introduced above, we now assume that each individual
votes not only for a single option or abstains, but votes for all those options he or
she approves of (which may be any number of options between 0 and k). Individual




















vij = 1 if and only if individual i votes (i.e. indicates approval) for option j. All
other de￿nitions, including that of an aggregation procedure, remain as stated above,
except that the concept of a pro￿le now refers to a pro￿le of approval votes, de￿ned
as a matrix v = (v1;:::;vn), where v1;:::;vn are the approval votes of individuals
1;:::;n. This captures the informational environment of approval balloting.
Under this modi￿cation, universal domain becomes the condition that the aggre-
gation procedure accepts all logically possible pro￿les of approval votes as admissible
input; the other three conditions retain their original interpretation.
The formal analogue of plurality rule under approval balloting is approval voting:
for any pro￿le of approval votes, the option, if unique, that receives the largest number
of votes (i.e. individual approvals), is chosen as the winner; if there is no unique such
option, then all the options that receive an equal largest number of votes (individual
approvals) are tied. The functional form which de￿nes approval voting is the same
as that which de￿nes plurality rule above ￿ except that it is now applied to the
informational environment of approval balloting. Formally, approval voting is the











vih for all h 6= j;
0 otherwise.
It is immediately obvious in this framework that approval voting satis￿es all of uni-
versal domain, anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness as formally stated
above. Does it satisfy these conditions uniquely? Not quite. The conditions are
also satis￿ed by a variant of approval voting in which the votes (i.e. indications of
18approval) cast by each individual are discounted by the total number of options for
which that individual votes. For example, under such a variant, if an individual votes
for only one option, then this vote might be given a weight of 1, but if he or she votes
for two options, then these votes might each be given a weight of only 1/2, and so
on (other methods of weighting or discounting might also be compatible with May￿ s
conditions).
However, if anonymity is strengthened subtly, then we obtain a May-style theorem
on approval voting.
Optionwise anonymity. Let ￿ be any permutation of the votes cast for some
option j (holding ￿xed the votes cast for other options), represented by a permutation
of the entries in row j in a pro￿le (holding ￿xed all other rows). For any pro￿le v,
f(v) = f(￿(v)).
Optionwise anonymity is the separate application of May￿ s original anonymity
condition to each option; it prevents di⁄erential treatment of an individual￿ s votes
on some option depending on his or her votes on other options. Informally, we
can describe the di⁄erence between anonymity and optionwise anonymity as follows.
Anonymity is compatible with a procedure whereby each individual submits a single
anonymous ballot paper on which he or she indicates which options he or she approves
of and which not. These ballot papers are then put into a ballot box and shu› ed. Yet,
although all information about the voters￿identity is eliminated, it is still possible to
associate anonymous voters with combinations of approved options; it is possible to
see, for example, that one voter has voted for options 1, 3 and 5, a second for options
2 and 3, a third for option 4 alone, and so on. Optionwise anonymity, by contrast,
requires a procedure whereby each individual submits a separate ballot paper for each
option, indicating approval or disapproval of that option. These ballot papers are then
put into separate ballot boxes, one ballot box for each option, and shu› ed inside these
19separate boxes. This eliminates not only all information about the voters￿identity,
but also all information about combinations of approved options. Under single-vote
balloting, where each voter can only vote for one option, anonymity and optionwise
anonymity are equivalent, but, under approval balloting, the two conditions come
apart, and optionwise anonymity is stronger than anonymity simpliciter.
Now a straightforward adjustment of our proof above leads to the following result.
Theorem. Under approval balloting, an aggregation procedure satis￿es universal
domain, optionwise anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness if and only if
it is approval voting.
This result not only shows that, in the richer informational environment of ap-
proval balloting, a May-style argument can be given in support of approval voting
￿a result not yet known in the literature ￿but it also illustrates the conditional
nature of our argument for plurality rule above. It should now be clear that the
question of what aggregation procedure to use depends crucially on the informational
environment in which this procedure is meant to operate.
5 Concluding remarks
Democratic theorists defend the use of ￿majority rule,￿often without saying precisely
which of a large range of broadly majoritarian voting procedures they mean (Spitz,
1984). Moreover, when giving May￿ s theorem pride of place in their arguments for
majority rule, they often gloss over the theorem￿ s restriction to decisions between two
options.
In the real world, ￿our standard voting system ... is ... the plurality vote, where
a voter votes for his favorite candidate and the candidate with the most votes wins￿
(Saari, 2006). Yet, of all the broadly majoritarian voting procedures that have been
20proposed in theory or are used in practice, plurality rule is perhaps the one that is
held in lowest esteem by theorists of democracy. As we have noted, plurality rule is
criticized in particular for focusing solely on voters￿revealed ￿￿rst choices￿and not
taking into account their full preferences.
However, just as the most commonly used aggregation procedure in the real world
is plurality rule, so the most commonly used balloting procedure is single-vote ballot-
ing. Surprisingly, it is has never been noticed before that, under single-vote balloting,
plurality rule is what May￿ s theorem, in a simple generalization to decisions over
many options, supports.
Our result ￿lls an important gap in the literature; it not only constitutes the
￿rst generalization of May￿ s theorem beyond pairwise decisions, but also provides
a conditional defence of plurality rule in the restricted, but empirically prominent
informational environment of single-vote balloting. If single-vote balloting is used, as
it often is in practice, then plurality rule is indeed the way to go.
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